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Patent Regulation in North-South and South-South Trade Agreements 
Salam Alshareef 
Abstract 
The article provides a comparative examination of patent provisions in both North-South and 
South-South Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs). It assesses whether the flexibilities of 
World Trade Organization Agreement on trade-related aspect Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS), are getting eliminated, preserved or affirmed in the studied PTAs. The article studies 
the PTAs of both the United States and European Union with developing countries as 
examples of North-South agreements, and the PTAs of both China and India with developing 
countries as examples of South-South agreements. The PTAs of US show systematic efforts 
to eliminate TRIPS flexibilities. EU chapters on IP engage partner countries to accede or 
comply with WIPO treaties in its earlier versions, and converge toward US approach in its 
latest versions. By contrast, China PTAs affirm commitment under TRIPS and emphasis some 
of its flexibilities. Patent related issues are absent from India’s PTAs. 
Keywords: Patent, TRIPS flexibilities, Preferential Trade Agreements, TRIPS plus. 
 
1- Introduction 
Industrial development is a long-term process of accumulation of diversified 
technological capabilities (Stiglitz et al, 2009). Access to knowledge and the accumulation of 
diversified technological capabilities are essential aspects of industrialization process (Cimoli 
et al, 2014). In fact, what separates developed from developing countries today is as much a 
gap in knowledge as a gap in resources. An essential aspect of “catching up” by developing 
countries is the emulation of technological leaders (Reinert, 2009) and the rapid accumulation 
of the knowledge and capabilities needed in order to sustain processes of technical learning.  
However this accumulation is influenced by broad array of policies and the existence 
of supporting institutions, including those governing the modes though which individuals and 
organizations can claim the legal rights to the exclusive exploitation of their knowledge. To 
put another way, technological capacities accumulation is influenced by the governance of 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) (Cimoli et al, 2014).1 
                                                          
1 Cimoli, Dosi and Stiglitz, (2009) noted that these policies historically happened to involve, to different degrees 
and according to specific local conditions, the following elements consistent with the ingredients we have 
previously identified in industrialization processes: (i) state ownership; (ii) selective credit allocation; (iii) 
favorable tax treatment to selective industries; (iv) restrictions on foreign investment; (v) local context 
requirements; (vi) special IPR regimes; (vii) government procurement; and (viii) promotion of large domestic 
firms. 
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Tight IPR regimes hinder the activities of reverse engineering and imitative 
experimentation which are typically at the core of the development process, Consequently 
they hinder the development of local technological capabilities in general and absorptive 
capabilities in particular (Dosi and Stiglitz, 2014). 
One of the well documented historical fact, it is the laxity or the absence of IPR in 
nearly all instances of successful industrialization experience to the extent that the emulation 
of the technological leaders can be identified as one of the few constants across those 
experience (Reinert, 2009, Cimoli et al, 2014). 
A major change was the incorporation of (IPR) in the international trade domain, 
culminating in the adoption of WTO agreement on Trade related Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPs). TRIPS agreement represents a historical impediment, in relative and absolute terms, 
to policies aiming at the structural transformation of developing economies. 
However, even if IPR homogenization reduces the spaces for policy maneuver, it did 
not end the “implementation game” at the national level (Deere, 2009). Within the new 
international framework, there remains room for countries to push for some strategic 
intellectual property management. TRIPs agreement provides some flexibilities, although 
scant, that may be further exploited and adapted consistently with industrial policy 
framework. However, legal feasibility and awareness of the existence of these flexibilities are 
not sufficient for countries to take advantage of them for two reasons.  
Moreover, those flexibilities are getting eliminated by some trade agreements that 
incorporate IPR standards which are even higher than those agreed under TRIPS agreement 
(TRIPs Plus). 
The paper provides de jure comparative examination of patent provisions under North-
South and South-South Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs). More precisely, it investigates 
the state of the so-called “TRIPS flexibilities” under the PTA, whether eliminated, kept or 
affirmed. 
As example of North-South PTAs the study covers 9 agreements of United State and 
10 European Union, signed with developing countries. As example of South-South PTAs 
agreement, the study covers 5 Chinese agreements and 8 Indian with developing countries. 
The aim behind the choice of these countries is to evaluate if there are significant differences 
between the conduct of emerging economies and core countries in their economic agreements 
with developing countries.  
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The articles would examine the level to which the US and the EU’S PTAs limit the 
possibility to design patent regulation at the national level, in a manner that favors  the 
upgrading of national technological capabilities, though the elimination of “TRIPS 
flexibilities”. In addition it aims to investigate any convergence in US and EU’s approaches to 
patent over time. 
In addition, it examines the extent to which the Chinese and Indian’s PTAs preserve 
or affirm “TRIPS flexibilities”. Moreover, it assesses if there is any convergence in south 
approaches to patent, through the example of Chinese and India. In addition empirical results 
would permit to estimate whether emerging economies, through the example of China and 
India, are promoting new institutions in international patent regulations through their PTAs. 
Results shows, in accordance to previous studies, that US’s PTAs eliminate 
systematically TRIPS Flexibilities. EU’s PTAs have been changing through time. While it 
tended to eliminate some flexibility in earlier PTAs through the engagement to adhere to 
WIPO’s treaties, the latest agreements join the US approach, eliminating more flexibility. 
China’s PTAs range from the absence of the mere term “intellectual property” and 
“patent” in some PTAs, to the inclusion of chapter on IPR in others. Whenever such chapters 
are included, all TRIPS flexibilities are maintained. Moreover, flexibilities were confirmed 
through their recurrent reference to Doha declaration. India’s PTAs introduce no regulations 
related to patent, and more generally to IPRs. 
The article is structured as follows. Next section presents, briefly, the TRIPS 
flexibility and TRIPS plus concepts, which would be used to formulate an analytical 
framework that permits to analyze, comparatively, patent provisions in studied PTAs. 
Sections 4, 5, 6 attempt to deduce Patent approaches of US, EU and China respectively. 
Section 7 concludes. 
2- TRIPs Plus commitments in PTAs 
TRIPS has placed significant constraints on countries’ autonomy in intellectual 
property matters. However, as a consensual outcome it has left room for variation across 
countries, labeled under the term “flexibilities”. This term designates the various legal 
doctrines and mechanisms that help to mitigate the effects deriving from the exclusive rights 
conferred to patentee. The flexibilities are derived from (1) an explicit exception to private 
right of patent owner, (3) ambiguities in the text that allow for different modalities of 
implementation, (4) some provisions indicate the objectives to be met rather than the specific 
ways in which they may be achieved. The TRIPS flexibilities may be useful for different 
objectives, ranging from local production to the importation of protected products at the 
lowest possible price (Correa, 2014). The degree to which such flexibilities are incorporated 
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into national laws determine the room available to adopt measures to upgrade technological 
capacities of the local economy. 
However, while developing countries have the right to exercise the flexibilities under 
the TRIPS Agreement, in reality it remains difficult for many of them to make effective use of 
them because of, inter alia, lack of infrastructural and technical expertise and lack of 
manufacture capacities. If IPR are enforced where productive and technological capabilities 
are weak and industrial policies are absent, countries have no bargaining power, and little 
capacity to recur to TRIPS flexibilities. At the same time, if these policy spaces remain 
unexplored and no active industrial policies are effectively implemented, the adoption of 
stronger IPR regimes will make the process of creation of capabilities even more difficult. 
It could be useful to emphasis that the very term “flexibilities” is relative. Some 
flexibilities are considered as such only when compared, on the one hand, to the orthodox 
interpretations of TRIPS provisions; and on the other hand, when compared to TRIPS plus 
provisions included in some bilateral trade agreements. 
TRIPS-plus is a concept which refers to the adoption of multilateral, plurilateral, 
regional and/or national intellectual property rules and practices which have the effect of 
reducing the ability of developing countries to protect the public interest. It covers both those 
activities aimed at increasing the level of protection for right holders beyond that which is 
given in the TRIPS Agreement and those measures aimed at reducing the scope or 
effectiveness of limitations on rights and exceptions (Dutfiel and Musungu, 2003). TRIPS 
plus includes any new standards that would limit the ability of these countries to: 
• promote technological innovation and to facilitate the transfer and dissemination of 
technology; 
• take necessary measures to protect public health, nutrition and to promote the public interest 
in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological development; or, 
• take appropriate measures to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right 
holders or the resort by right holders to practices which affect the international transfer of 
technology. 
Based on both the abundant literature on TRIPS flexibilities (e.g. Mercurio, 2006; 
Shadlen, 2005; Matthias Lamping et al, 2014) and the author observations in studied PTAs, 
Table (1) present an analytical aiming at identifying TRIPS plus commitments in the studied 
PTAs. The framework would permit the comparison of studied PTAs to each other and to 
TRIPS commitments. It provides an overall view of TRIPS plus commitments as observed in 
the Studied 33 PTAs (Listed in table 2 in annex). In addition, it reports reference to Doha 
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Declaration and the Convention Biological Diversity, which could be considered TRIPS 
minus. India PTAs have no reference to IPR issues or patent, therefore it is not included in the 
table. 
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1- 
Reference 
to 
Internation
al 
Agreement
s 
                                          
 
Doha 
Declarati
on 
                 x x x   x x x x 
Patent 
Law 
Treaty 
x x x  x x x x x x    x x       
Patent 
Cooperati
on Treaty 
x x x x x x x x x x   x x x      x 
UPOV 
1991 
x x x x x x x x x x  x x x x       
Budhapes
t 
x x x  x x  x x x  x x x x      x 
Conventi
on on 
Biologica
l diversity 
             x x       
2-Patent 
Granting 
Conditions 
 
                    
Scope of 
patentability 
                     
 
Novelty x x x   x x x x x             
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definition 
Industrial 
applicabil
ity 
definition 
x   x   x x   x x             
New uses 
for 
known 
products 
x x x      x             
Plant x x x x x x x x x             
Animal x                     
Information 
disclosure 
x   x     x   x x             
Test and 
clinical data 
x x x   x   x x             
Right 
exhaustion 
and parallel 
importing 
x x x   x x x x x             
Patent 
Duration 
x x x   x x x x x             
Patent 
Revocation 
x x x   x x x x x x       x x       
3- 
Exception 
to patent 
right 
 
                    
Compulsory 
Liecence 
                     
 
Direct 
restriction 
   x                        
Indirect 
restriction 
x x x  x x x x x             
 
3- US’s Patent Approach in PTAs 
US’s PTAs seems to be consistent over time with little variation from agreement to 
another. It increases patent protection level in each aspect of TRIPS flexibilities, with respect 
to all product and with respect to specific product, i.e. Agrochemical and pharmaceutics. In 
addition US engage other parties to adhere, commit and comply with World intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO) treaties. Paper discusses TRIPS plus commitment included in 
WIPO treaties on section on EU approach. 
3.1- Patenting scope 
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US PTAs broaden the patentability scope by removing the ambiguity that exists under 
TRIPS and exporting the more liberal interpretation: 
A - It defines “novelty” in a more expansive way, where goods can pass the novelty 
test and be granted a patent if the knowledge has been disclosed within the year prior to 
application.2 During this period the inventor may search for financing or test the market for 
his/her invention before initiating the costly and complicated steps to patent the invention. In 
most countries, any disclosure annuls the novelty characteristic of an invention.  
B - They mandate that patents be available for new uses of known products. The effect 
of this provision is to allow a first registrant of a new chemical product (especially 
pharmaceutical) to obtain protection even in the case of old and well known products, 
extending the patent term.  
C - US own definition of Industrial applicability, that emphasis the “usefulness”, was 
adopted3. An invention only needs to be operable and capable of satisfying some function of 
benefit to humanity. Thus, certain developments that do not lead to an industrial product may 
be patented. The U.S. rule permits the patentability of purely experimental inventions that 
cannot be made or used in an industry, or that do not produce a so-called technical effect, as 
illustrated by granting patent, for example, to methods of doing business (UNCTAD-ICTSD, 
2005). 
D - They Permit the patentability of excluded subject matter under TRIPS, that’s 
plants and/or animals. The strongest agreement in this regard is US-Morocco, which explicitly 
mandates the provision of patent protection for life forms.  Where plant patenting is not 
required, it introduce obligation to “undertake all reasonable efforts to make such patent 
protection available”. In the absence of plant patents, at the very least, a UPOV 1991 system 
should be granted (this point will be discussed in the section on EU approach). 
3.2- Disclosure requirements and data exclusivity 
                                                          
2 CAFTA-DR Art15.9.7, Chile Art 17.9.7, Colombia Art 16.9.7, Panama Art 15.9.7, Peru 16.9.7, Morocco Art 
15.9.8, Oman 15.8.7; Bahrain Art 14.8.8, 
3 US PTA with Panama Art 15.9.11, Peru Art 16.9.11, Oman 15.8.11, Morocco Art 16.9.11, Colombia Art 
16.9.11 and CAFTA-DR Art 15.9.11. 
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Disclosure provisions wording is more consistent with US law than the original 
provision of the TRIPS Agreement4 (Morin, 2004), introducing a ceiling to the disclosure 
requirement. For instance, the expressions “to be made and used” and “without undue 
experimentation” are directly imported from US law. Indeed, this provision appears to forbid 
countries from asking for more than “information that allows the invention to be made and 
used” in order to accept a disclosure as sufficiently clear and complete. Experimentation is 
permitted under TRIPS. Here again US PTAs, limits this flexibility when specifying that 
“undue experimentation” are not permitted. However it doesn’t define criteria about what do 
constitute “undue” experimentation. 
Those provisions limit the ability to require the disclosure of the origin of genetic 
resources used in the development of biotechnological inventions, which is a demand of many 
developing countries rich with genetics resources. Finally, disclosure provisions in US PTAs 
eliminate the facultative requirements under TRIPS to demand the best mode of carrying out 
the invention. 
US PTAs5, prevent the later applicant and the national authority from disclosing or 
relying on the clinical studies and data provided by the original applicant when seeking to 
register the generic version of the drug or agriculture chemical product for a given period of 
time following the first registration (5 years for Pharmaceutical and 10 years chemical 
agriculture product). US PTAs include provision6 which apply the same period of data 
exclusivity from the approval date in another country even if the manufacturer has not sought 
to register the drug in that particular country. Thus, a generic manufacturer wishing to market 
and distribute a generic whilst the period of data exclusivity is in force must conduct its own 
clinical trials and other data and submit its findings to the national authority. The end result of 
data exclusivity in third country being that the country does not have access to that particular 
drug or agriculture chemical product until the expiration of the data exclusivity period. 
In addition, certains PTAs eliminate the Article 39.3 requirement in TRIPS which 
protects data only in cases where the pharmaceutical in question utilizes ‘new chemical 
                                                          
4
 US PTAs with CAFTA-DR Art 15.9.9 Panama Art 15.9.9, Peru Art 15.9.9, Oman Art 15.8.10, Morocco Art 
15.9.10, Colombia Art 16.9.9 and Bahrain 14.8.10. 
5 Bahrain Art 14.9.1, Oman Art 15.9.1, CAFTA-DR Art 15.10.1, Colombia Art 16.10.1, Morocco Art 15.10.1, 
Peru16.10.1 Panama Art 15.10.1 and Chile Art 17.10.1 
6
 These provisions are found in FTAs between the US and CAFTA-DR (Art. 15(10)(1)(b)), Morocco (Art. 
15(10)(2)), Bahrain (Art. 14(9)(1)(b)). Data exclusivity for product registered in another territory Panam, 
15(10)(1)(b), Peru, Article 16(10)(1)(b), Colombia Article 16.10.1. 
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entities’ and where the generation of data involves considerable effort7. The provision 
requires data protection with respect to any new product. The latter is loosely defined as ‘one 
that does not contain a chemical entity that has previously been approved by the Party’. Such 
protection may be sought irrespective of whether any effort was spent in the generating the 
data (Mercurio, 2006). 
It is worth noting that data exclusivity, under US PTAs, operates independently of the 
patent status: drugs that are unpatented, because no patent was obtained in the first place, can 
receive protection from generic competition for a minimum of five years (Shadlen, 2005). 
Concerning pharmaceutical products, US PTAs link test data protection to the patent 
term, generic manufacturers may not obtain marketing approval at any time during the patent 
period, and even in preparation to enter the market upon patent expiry8. 
Several US PTAs9 introduce provisions which prevent national drug regulatory authorities 
from registering a generic version of a drug that is under patent in the country without the 
consent of the patent holder. This provision represents a significant shift from traditional 
operating standards, where the market approval of a drug, that is the regulatory approval 
granted to a product which proves its safety and efficacy, has not been linked to a drug’s 
patent status. Thus, the patent status of a drug has never had bearing on whether a drug is of 
sufficient quality, safety and efficacy to be marketed in a particular nation or region.  
As a result, if a patent holder believes a generic manufacturer is infringing its patent, it 
traditionally has the responsibility to enforce its rights. In practice, this entails the patent 
holder bringing suit against the alleged infringer in an effort to prevent further sales of the 
infringing product and recover damages. This process can be lengthy and costly, but ensures 
the validity of a patent before enforcing the rights asserted by the plaintiff. In addition, IPRs 
have always been recognized as ‘private rights’ (TRIPS explicitly supports this position) and 
it seems logical that the owner of private rights should be responsible for their enforcement. 
The newly delegated role of the regulatory authority as an ‘enforcer’ of a private right is 
therefore a significant benefit to the rights holder. 
                                                          
7 See Panama Art.15.10.4.a, Peru Art.16.10.4.a  CAFTA-DR Art.15.10.1.c, Morocco Art.15.10.1, and Bahrain 
Art.14.9.1.c, Peru Art.16.10.1.c, Colombia Art.16.10.1.c, Oman Art.15.9.1.c and Panama Art.15.10.1.c. 
8 These rules are embodied in the PTAs with CAFTA-DR Art. 15.10.2, Colombia Art.15.10.4.a, Morocco Art. 
15.10.4, Bahrain Arts. 14.9.4.a Oman 15.9.4.a. 
9
 See Arts 19.5.3 of CAFTA-DR; 17.9.4 of US–Chile; 15.9.6 of US–Morocco; and 14.8.5 of US–Bahrain, 
Panama 15.10.4, Colombia 16.9.5, Peru 16.9.5, Oman 15.8.5. 
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In addition, this linkage plays as de facto patent, ensuring a minimum period of 
monopoly for pharmaceutical companies, preventing competition, and in some instances, it 
may even prohibit a generic manufacturer from seeking registration in a country. A period of 
data exclusivity could be detrimental to countries taking advantage of a compulsory license. 
The Data exclusivity and the linkage between market approval and patent statute could 
effectively render the compulsory license meaningless if it cannot make effective use of the 
license without repeating time-consuming and costly tests to obtain marketing approval of its 
drug (Mercurio, 2006). 
3.3- Patent term extensions Patent revocation and right exhaustion 
US PTAs extend patent protection term by engaging other parties to ‘compensate’ any 
‘unreasonable’ delay in examining an application for registration, through extending the 
patent term in the same amount of time as the ‘unreasonable’ delay (often stated as a period 
extending beyond five years from the date of the filing or three years after a request for an 
extension)10. 
Moreover, US PTAs restricts the ability to revoke a patent to be “ only on grounds that 
would have justified a refusal to grant the patent” 11. Moreover, pre-grant patent oppositions 
were forbidden.12  
Some PTAs13, call Article 5.A.3 of Paris Convention as condition for the revocation, 
where forfeiture shouldn’t be provided except in case where compulsory license would not 
compensate the claimed abuse. In addition, the article prevents any proceeding before two 
years from the granting of compulsory license. Thus, the space for refusal of patent is 
narrowed, and the function of compulsory license is counterbalanced to become a vehicle to 
protect patent holder right. 
Some the US PTAs prohibit parallel importation14. However, a number of US PTAs 
with developing countries, including Chile, Jordan, and CAFTA-DR, are silent on the 
exhaustion of patent rights. However, the article linking market approval to patent status 
contains obligation stating that party couldn’t export a patented product for reason other than 
                                                          
10 For example, Article 15(9)(6) of the CAFTA-DR, Bahrain 14.8.6.a, Chile 17.9.6, Colombia Art.16.9.6.b, 
Panama Art.15.9.6.b, Peru 16.9.6.b, Jordan 23.a, Morocco, Oman Art.15.8.6.a Art.15.9.7. 
11
 Morocco Art.15.9.5, Bahrain 14.8.4, Oman 15.8.4, Chile 17.9.4, CAFTA-DR Art.15.9.4, Peru Art.16.9.4, 
Panama Art.15.9.4, Colombia 16.9.4. 
12 In the case of US PTAs with Morocco, Oman, Bahrain  
13
 with Panama, CAFTA-DR, Peru, Colombia 
14 US-Morocco (Article 15(9)(4)) 
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for marketing approval requirements. Practically, this provision prohibit partner to be a source 
of parallel importation for their countries who are not member of PTAs with US.  
3.4-Complsury licensing restrictions 
The restrictions placed on compulsory licensing through PTAs exist at two levels. 
First, PTAs indirectly restrict compulsory licensing as a result of the data exclusivity 
provisions and the linking of market approval to patent status (Mercurio, 2006). Second, 
direct restrictions limit the grounds on which compulsory licenses can be issued. Unlike 
TRIPS, these provisions are drawn in the negative and confine the use of compulsory licences 
to specified cases, such as remedying an anti-competitive practice, public non-commercial 
contexts, national emergencies and other cases of extreme urgency, and the failure to meet 
working requirements15. 
4- EU’s Patent Approach in PTAs 
Patent provisions in EU PTA have changed over. The earlier versions commit parties 
to the implementation of TRIPS and to “the highest international standards of protection”, 
with commitments to adhere to WIPO treaties (where EU is already member). As will be 
discussed below, those agreements contain TRIPS plus provisions. In addition, where those 
agreements do not contain dispute settlement mechanism, their inclusion in PTAs makes them 
enforceable. 
However, in the first phase of EU agreements, due to TRIPS NT and MFN provisions, 
the EU was able to free-ride on the highest international standards set by the US in earlier 
PTAs with the same countries (Watal, 2014). According to TRIPS article 4, any PTA 
provision on IP matters that enters into force after the TRIPS Agreement and that consists of 
an “advantage, favour, privilege or immunity” shall be “immediately and unconditionally” 
accorded to the nationals of all other Members. 
EU re-examined it strategy in PTA agreement concerning IP, which was manifested 
by launching the EU’s Strategy to enforce Intellectual Property Rights in third countries of 
2004, in which one of the suggested actions was to “revisit the approach to the IPR chapters 
of bilateral agreements, including the clarification and strengthening of the enforcement 
clauses”. The EU apply this as part of its Global Europe Strategy, which provides that “[i]n 
negotiating PTAs, the IPR clauses should as far as possible offer identical levels of IPR 
                                                          
15 Such provisions appear in US PTA with Jordan Art. 4.20. 
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protection to that existing in the EU while taking into account the level of development of the 
countries concerned” (EC, 2011, p21). 
The section proceeds as follow, firstly it analyses TRIPS plus engagement in WIPO 
treaties that parties have to accede or comply with in the EU (and US) agreements. Then it 
turns to analyze elements found in the second generation. 
4.1- International agreements 
All generation of European approach to IP include obligation or promotion to accede and 
apply agreements that was not included in TRIPS. Those agreements are the International 
Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) 1991, The Budapest Treaty on 
the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms, Patent Cooperation Treaty 
(PCT) and Patent Law Treaty (PLT). The impact of those treaties on the international law is 
the same as that of any other TRIPS-plus provisions; and for He (2010) in this way the 
“TRIPS Agreement is amended, even though the amendment is not applicable to all WTO 
Members”. 
There are three types of commitment: the accession to a treaty within a certain 
deadline, the endeavour to accede to a treaty and compliance with a treaty. 
Before discussing TRIPS plus provisions of those treaties, it should be noted that most of 
studied EU PTAS have no reference to Doha declaration16. PTA with Andean community 
states that in interpreting and implementing the rights and obligations under the PTAs “the 
Parties shall ensure consistency with this Declaration”. 
 
4.1.1- UPOV 1991 17 
The TRIPs Agreement leaves to each country’s discretion whether to protect new plant 
varieties by means of patent or by effective sui generis system or by any combination thereof. 
Thus, developing countries are not obliged to provide for the protection of plant varieties 
under patents nor to comply with UPOV provisions, instead, they may prefer to develop their 
own sui generis system of protection. 
The 1991 Act abandon the clear prohibition on double protection in 1978 Act (sui 
generis system and patent), so that a Contracting Party is, so far as the 1991 Act is concerned, 
free to protect varieties, in addition to the grant of a breeder’s right, by the grant patents. (El-
Saghir et al, 2006) 
                                                          
16
 PTAs with CARIFURM use a shallow language, that it “recognize the importance” of the Doha Declaration 
on the TRIPS” 
17 All EU studied PTAs include obligation to adhere to UPOV (1991). 
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UPOV ‘91 requires a comprehensive coverage of plant varieties by the member states. 
States that have been members of the Convention have a five year transition period to meet 
this requirement. New members to the Union, however, are required (Article 3) to protect 15 
genera or species on accession (5 for UPOV 1978) and include all genera and species within 
10 years (a minimum of 24 after 8 years). 
Under the 1991 Act, the right of the breeder in respect of the production of 
propagating material is not limited to “production for the purpose of commercial marketing”, 
rather it is extended to all production. Thus, breeder’s authorization is needed in respect of the 
propagating material of a protected variety, any production or reproduction (multiplication), 
conditioning for the purpose of propagation, offering for sale, selling or other marketing, 
exporting, importing and stocking. As a general rule, farmer’ would no longer be able to 
freely save and re-sow propagating material from the previous year’s harvest where this is the 
common practice in developing countries. However, Article 15.2 provides an optional 
exception which permits Contracting States to restrict the breeder’s rights, within reasonable 
limits and subject to the safeguarding of the legitimate interests of the breeder, in order to 
permit farmers to use for propagating purposes, on their holdings, the propagating material 
from the previous year’s harvest18. however such exception is valid only for varieties which 
are essentially derived from the protected variety, where the protected variety is not itself an 
essentially derived variety (EDV), and for  varieties which are not clearly distinguishable (El-
SAGHIR et al, 2006). 
  Article 14(5), which provides for the inclusion of EDVs of protected varieties within 
plant breeders’ rights, seeks to strengthen the rights of the breeder by bringing within 
protection “essentially derived and certain other varieties” of the protected varieties. Under 
this provision, the so-called “research exemption” available under UPOV 78, which allowed 
breeders to freely use protected varieties for research purposes and for breeding new varieties, 
was excluded (Dhar, 2002). 
The duration of protection of breeders right under the 1991 Act for plant varieties was 
extended to not less than twenty years from the date of the grant of the breedesr’s right (15 
years in UPOV 1978), and for trees and vines the duration should not be less than twenty-five 
years19. 
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 Article 15.2. 
19 
 Article 19. 
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4.1.2- The Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of 
Microorganisms 
This treaty was signed in 1977 as a means of facilitating compliance with the 
requirement of “disclosure” in the procedure for obtaining a patent. Normally, a written 
description of the invention is required to obtain a patent. Since such a description is difficult 
in cases where the invention involves a microorganism, the Budapest Treaty allows the 
deposit of microorganisms to be considered sufficient disclosure in these cases, and also 
provides international authorities with which this deposit may be made (Vivas-Eugui, Oliva, 
2010). 
As the term “microorganism” is interpreted broadly, encompassing any biological 
material whose deposit is necessary for purposes of disclosure – particularly in the food and 
pharmaceutical sectors – these rules can also be interpreted as tactics for facilitating and 
promoting patents on plants and animals. Although the Budapest Treaty do not affect 
patentability criteria, it complement and facilitate the description of the invention. Procedures 
for obtaining patents promote patent protection. 
4.1.3- Patent cooperation treaty (PCT) and Patent Law Treaty (PLT) 
The PCT provides patent owners with an easy and cost-effective mechanism to 
globally file patent applications. While individual nations still examine whether an application 
meets national criteria of patentability, a PCT application streamlines the process with an 
initial single application; National examination occurs later (Ho, 2011). 
It provides the applicant with several benefits. First, the applicant can initiate a request 
for a patent in all countries that are members of the PCT; however, the high costs of many 
parallel national applications are deferred for a period of months and sometimes years. The 
lag time also enables an applicant to delay a decision concerning which countries are 
desirable for patent protection. Second, the applicant is entitled to a preliminary examination 
of its patent application through the PCT, which, if negative, may enable the applicant to elect 
not to pursue some or all national applications. While this may seem a small procedural detail, 
it may have significant implications, given that countries that are not members of the PCT are 
likely to have few patents filed (Ho, 2011).  
Some countries have obligation to comply with or accede to Patent Law treaty 
established in 2001. The main objective of PLT is to harmonize the formal requirements 
relating to the procedures for applying for, obtaining and maintaining patents. The treaty 
contains a set of standardized formal requirements for national and regional patent offices to 
apply when dealing with patent applications. It covers: filing date, standardized forms, 
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procedures for examination, compliance with time limits, means for avoiding unintentional 
loss of rights and electronic filing (Musungu and Dutfiel, 2003). 
The PLT, in effect, will enhance the position of patent owners by combining 
deregulatory measures with safeguards for them. For example, article 10 provides that non-
compliance by a patent holder with one or more of the formal requirements under the treaty 
may not be a ground for revocation or invalidation of a patent except where fraudulent 
intention is proven. The burden of proof for fraudulent intention is usually very high 
(Musungu and Dutfiel, 2003). In addition it include obligation to give the patent applicant the 
opportunity to make observation, amendments and corrections, where such practice are 
“permitted under applicable law”. 
These tow treaties serve to eliminate indirect obstacles that could be used by national 
authorities in order to delay the deliverance of patent or to refuse it. After all, even if domestic 
laws offer the type of patent protection desired that protection is elusive if there are too many 
logistical hurdles to obtaining patent protection. The ability to use a PCT application removes 
such hurdles. 
4.2- Expanding patentee exclusive rights 
Thus, EU’s latest proposal on IP in bilateral negotiations consists of detailed 
provisions on almost every issue covered by the (TRIPS). Actually, many of these provisions 
go beyond the minimum standards of TRIPS. The first translation to this shift was the EU-
South Korea PTA in 2010 and the EU-Peru-Colombia trade agreement. 
The definitions sometime go beyond those employed in the TRIPS Agreement, as they 
often include issues, which are still being discussed multilaterally (e.g. rights to traditional 
knowledge (TK), folklore and genetic resources) or have not been discussed at all (e.g. 
protection of non-original databases, utility model). EU PTA broadens the definition of 
intellectual property to include categories that wasn’t considered IP in TRIPS. The agreement 
with CARIFURM and Andean community incorporate the protection of plant varieties in the 
definition of IP. In addition, it emphasis in the definition of IP that patent include 
biotechnological inventions. 
Patent term extension is mandated in case of delays resulting from marketing approval 
procedure. 
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New PTAs20 engages partner to grant an exclusivity period and the non-reliability, for 
data related to safety and efficacy, even if submitted in another party territory, of 10 years to 
(new) chemical agriculture product and 5 years for pharmaceutical products. Articl 231.3 of 
EU-Peru-Colombia defines the new chemical product as “the one which has not been 
previously approved in the territory of the Party for its use in a pharmaceutical or chemical 
agricultural product”. Consequently, it forces parties to accord patent for new uses for known 
chemical entities. 
4.3-  Plants varieties 
New versions of EU PTAs include provisions on patent varieties. In this respect, the 
EU-CARIFORUM PTAs, on the one hand, leaves the parties the freedom to provide for 
exceptions to the so-called plant breeders’ rights21, and on the other hand, by requiring the 
parties to accede to UPOV 1991 prevents them from exchanging or transferring the saved 
material to others. These two requirements are contradictory (Nadde-Phlix, 2014). 
The EU-Col-Peru PTA is more straightforward regarding the protection of plant 
varieties (Article 232). The same applies to the PTA with Korea, which requires the parties to 
the agreement to provide for the protection of plant varieties and to comply with UPOV 1991. 
4.4-  Biodiversity, genetic resource traditional knowledge (CBD) 
The protection of TK and biodiversity is a new component in the IP chapters of new 
EU PTAs, starting with the EU-CARIFORUM PTA. However, the related provisions reflect 
existing obligations under the CBD in addition to recognizing the importance of the CBD’s 
objectives and principles.22 In this context, it is worth mentioning that the EU, Peru, 
Colombia, Central America, South Korea and the CARIFORUM States are members of the 
CBD and therefore are bound by its provisions. Many of these countries are also signatories 
of the Nagoya Protocol and hence will be bound by its provisions once the Protocol enters 
into force. 
EU-CARIFORUM PTAs allows the parties to require “that the applicant identifies the 
sources of the biological material used by the applicant and described as part of the 
invention”23 as a part of administrative requirements. 
This provision is optional, as it authorizes but does not mandate national governments 
to apply it. Accordingly, the CARIFORUM States can make use of its provision; however, 
                                                          
20
 EU-Korea Article 10.36 and article 10.37, EU-Peru and Colombia Article 231.5 
21 It gives the parties “the right to provide for exceptions to exclusive rights granted to plant breeders to allow 
farmers to save, use and exchange protected farm-saved seed or propagating material” 
22
 See Article 150 of the EU-CARIFORUM PTAs, Articles 196.4 and 201 of the EU-Colombia and Peru PTA, 
and Article 10.40 of the EU-South Korea PTA. 
23 Article 150.4 
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they cannot oblige the EU to apply it, and it does not mention the consequences of non-
compliance. But the word “source”, rather than “origin”, gives it wider connotation and 
includes both geographical origins as the origin and/or supplier. This provision may be linked 
to the preamble to the European Biotechnology Directive, which provides for voluntary 
disclosure of the geographical origin of biological material (Vivas-Eugui, Oliva, 2010).  
Provisions on GR and TK in EU-South Korea PTA, are similar to the ones provided in 
the EU-CARIFORUM PTA excluding any mention of the disclosure requirement issue24. 
The EU-Col-Peru PTA acknowledges “the usefulness of requiring the disclosure of the 
origin or source of genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge in patent 
applications”25. It also adds that “the Parties will provide, in accordance with their domestic 
law, for applicable effects of any such requirement so as to support compliance with the 
provisions regulating access to genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge, 
innovations and practices”26.  
Although one scholar interprets this provision as an obligation that would require the 
EU to amend its current Directive on Biotechnology in order to determine the effects of the 
lack of fulfillment (Vivas-Eugui, Oliva, 2010), another scholar suggests that Article 201 of 
the EU-Col-Peru PTA states principles of protection “subject to national legislation” that fail 
to create clear obligations of the EU to protect GR, TK and folklore (Drexl, 2014). 
In sum it seems that the EU limits itself to IP concessions that reflect the level of 
protection available at the Community level (Nadde-Phlix, 2014). However, a safeguard 
clause has been included in most EU PTAs which enables parties to the Agreements to review 
the provisions relating to biodiversity and TK in the light of the results and conclusions of the 
related multilateral discussions27. 
5- China’s Patent Approach in PTAs 
The paper covers six Chinese trade agreements with ASEAN (2007), Pakistan 
(2009), Chile (2010), Peru (2010), Costa Rica (2011), and South Korea (2015). Those 
agreements either do not cover IPR or provide for very limited coverage. The first 
agreement with developing country to introduce a separate chapter on intellectual property 
is China-Peru agreement to be followed by agreements with both Costa Rica and South 
Korea. 
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 Article 10.40 of the EU-South Korea PTA. 
25 Article 201(7) of the EU-Col-Peru PTA. 
26 Article 201(8) of the EU-Col-Peru PTA. 
27
 Article 150(6) of the EU-CARIFORUM PTAs, Article 201(13) of the EU-Colombia and Peru PTA and Article 
10.40(3) of the EU-South Korea PTA. 
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Common element in those chapters is the emphasis on the need to attain a balance 
between patentee rights and the legitimate interest of users and community with regard to 
protected invention. In addition, they include engagement, though without practical 
implication, to prevent any practice that constitute an abuse of IPR by patentee and have 
the effect of adversely affecting or limiting technology transfer28. 
5.1- Genetic resource, traditional knowledge and folklore 
In fact many developing countries have complained of bio-piracy, in which 
multinational firms take their traditional knowledge and genetic resources and use it to 
produce patented product that could be very profitable. Consequently, Developing 
countries had been pushing in various international forums to make mandatory the 
disclosure of the source and/or country of origin of biological resources, of associated, if 
such resources and traditional knowledge are contained in an invention over which an 
applicant is seeking patent rights. Those efforts produced the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD), which is not signed by US yet. 
Chapters on IPR in China’s agreements include provisions on genetic resource, 
traditional knowledge and folklore. They affirm the principles and provisions established in 
the CBD, and encourage the effort to establish a mutually supportive relationship between 
the CBD and TRIPS Agreement. The agreement with Korea was signed after the 
conclusion of Nagoya protocol, so Article 15.17.2 affirms the “respect” to its requirement, 
“especially those on prior informed consent and fair and equitable sharing of benefits “.  
Importantly, they affirm each country right to adopt or maintain any measure which 
aim to promote the equitable sharing of benefits arising from the use of genetic resources 
and traditional knowledge. Finally, they leave opened the possibility to negotiate in the 
future on the question of resource disclosure and prior informed consent obligations in 
patent applications.29 
The textual language in the provision therefore clearly indicates that the protection 
of genetic resources, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions is merely 
optional, not mandatory. Moreover, the protection the provision calls for is consistent with 
the intellectual property laws and policies of China. Article 26 of the Chinese Patent Law 
requires patent applicants to disclose the traditional knowledge and genetic resources used 
in their inventions (Zhuang, 2013). 
                                                          
28
 See Article 144 China-Peru trade agreement, Article 109 and 110 in China-Costa Rica trade agreement, Article 
15.1 and Article 15.2China-South Korea trade agreement. 
29
 Article 145 China-Peru trade agreement, Article 111 China-Costa Rica trade agreement, and Article15.17.4 
China-Korea trade agreement. 
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5.2- Plant varieties 
China-Korea trade agreement contains the most comprehensive chapter on IP and 
serves as example of extreme limit of provision on patent observed in studied agreement. 
In general, it restates commitments under TRIPS. Its definition of IPRs includes elements 
that were not contained in the TRIPS, at least separately e.g. plant verities and utility 
model30. In contrast, the definition does not mention elements that were covered in the 
TRIPS, e.g. Geographical Indication and Layout-Designs (Topographies) of Integrated 
Circuits (See Footnote 52). 
Article 15.18 on plant varieties restates some commitments under the International 
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 1978 (UPOV 1978), where the 
two countries are already members. Article 15.18.3 stipulate: “The Parties shall respect 
regulations on new plant varieties protection of the other Party and grant adequate and 
effective protection to breeders of new plant varieties”. And it establishes that the 
propagating material of the protected variety shall require the authorization of the breeder 
in case of: (a) production or reproduction (multiplication) for the purposes of commercial 
marketing; (b) conditioning for the purpose of commercial propagation; (c) offering for 
sale; (d) selling or other marketing; and importing or exporting. 
Thus, farmers are free to save and re-sow propagating material from the previous 
year’s harvest, as the permission of the breeder is only required for the production for 
“commercial marketing”. Breeder’s permission is not also required, either for utilization of 
the protected variety for the purpose of breeding additional new varieties or for the 
marketing of such varieties31. It should be noted that the Article 15.3 affirm also parties’ 
commitments under UPOV 197832. Given that Korea is a member of UPOV 1991, it seems 
that China does not accept engagement going beyond 1978. UPOV 1991 is criticized to 
favors breeders on framers, because it prevents all utilization of plant varieties by farmers 
without breeder consent. In fact, the accession to UPOV 1991 is recurrent obligation under 
US and EU trade agreement. 
5.3- Doha declaration 
                                                          
30
 Article on utility models is too brief and contains no engagement. It simply states “party agree to enhance 
cooperation at this level”. 
31
  Article 5(3) of UPOV 1978. 
32
 The two parties affirm their commitment in many treaties where they are already members, with no additional 
obligation to comply with or accede to other agreements. 
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Finally, a characteristic of Chinese patent provisions is the inclusion of a separate 
article on the Intellectual Property and Public Health that recognize principals established 
in Doha declaration33. 
This reference is of major importance, given that the existence of a number of 
flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement has been confirmed by the WTO Ministerial 
Conference, the highest WTO body, through the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health. The Declaration is the first WTO instrument to specifically 
use the concept of ‘flexibility’ with regard to the TRIPS Agreement (Correa, 2014). 
Although the Doha Declaration focused on IPRs related to public health, it is 
relevant to IPRs in any field of technology. Paragraph 5 of the Doha Declaration34 specifies 
some of the flexibilities available to facilitate access to pharmaceutical products. The 
wording of the chapeau of this paragraph makes it clear that it only enumerates some of the 
possible flexibilities. Sub-paragraph (a) confirms the relevance of article 7 of the TRIPS 
Agreement35 for the interpretation of its provisions, thereby suggesting that the TRIPS 
Agreement must be interpreted in a manner that favors access by third parties to technology 
necessary to further innovation and domestic production. One important element of Doha 
declaration is the affirmation of members’ liberty of to define the ground upon which they 
issue compulsory license. According to Correa (2014) Paragraph 5 is particularly relevant 
to the implementation of measures intended to expand domestic production with the use of 
protected technologies. 
5- Conclusions 
Empirical results show the systematics and clear tendency of North-South PTAs to 
eliminate, even to varied degrees, the TRIPS flexibilities. US’s approach is the tightest 
where each aspect of TRIPS flexibilities is affected negatively restraining ability of its use. 
EU’s approach seems evolved over time from basically introducing engagements to adhere 
                                                          
33
 China-South Korea Article 15.5, China-Peru Article 144.6, China-Costa Rica Article 112, China Chile Article 
111. 
34
 It states “while maintaining our commitments in the TRIPS Agreement, we recognize that these flexibilities 
include: 
a. In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international law, each provision of the TRIPS 
Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its 
objectives and principles. 
b. Each member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the grounds upon 
which such licences are granted” 
35
 This article provides that the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights ‘should contribute to 
the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology’. The Agreement 
should not be regarded as a charter of absolute rights to control the exploitation of protected technologies, but 
rather as an instrument that requires the use of such technologies ‘to the mutual advantage of producers and users 
of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare’ (article 7). 
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and comply with WIPO treaties (an element that is included US approach), to converge to 
US approach in its PTAs. Consequently, de jure Policy Space for state practices aiming at 
the technological capabilities accumulation is substantially reduced in both US and EU’s 
PTAs. 
While India PTAs have no reference to any matter related to IP and patent, Chinese 
approach even pragmatic, where texts are varied from PTA to another. Patent related issues 
are either absent from Chinese trade agreements or covered limitedly. Its patent provisions 
are shallow, rhetoric and contain no additional commitments relative to parties’ previous 
engagements. Consequently, they do not limit the ability of its partners to use TRIPS 
flexibilities in a framework of industrial policy aiming at fostering technological 
capabilities. 
We can say that common elements in the India and China, are those which are not 
treated in their agreements, that’s the absence of higher patent standards than those found 
in TRIPS. However it is apparent that the two countries do not promote any new  model of 
patent regulation through their PTAs.  
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